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Abstract 
 
The reason of this research is to understand the relationship between non-
financial factors such as corporate governance and ESG disclosure, and a 
firm’s financial performance. 
There have been lots of research based on the connection between the 
organisation corporate governance and their financial performance. However 
these have found mixed result that warranted further research.  There has 
been a growing interest in ESG information becoming more important to 
investors, creating the need for better disclosure practises.  This research will 
look at how ESG disclosure is connected to the performance of a firm. 
This paper used regression analysis to determine if there was any correlation 
between the variables. The data used was from five different markets over five 
years, giving 4480 observations. The study found that there is a positive 
connection between the ESG disclosure score and ROA, ROE and ROC, however 
negative for TobinQ. There was also a negative correlation to firm performance 
from board size and meeting per year, while a positive correlation with the 
percentage of independent directors. This research heights the importance of 
considering the effects of corporate governance and ESG disclosure, where 
corporations, investors and stakeholder are considering future performance 
and sustainability. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This dissertation aims to analyse non-financial factors that affect a company’s 
performance, specifically focusing on corporate governance and the levels of 
ESG (environment, social and governance) disclosure. Investors are continually 
looking for indicators that they can use to predict the financial performance 
of an organisation. The modern investor is risk adverse, wanting the highest 
return for the lowest level of risk. This means that they are analysing not just 
the financial information but non-financial, such as corporate governance or 
ESG performance. This information is used to analyse a company’s financial 
performance and sustainability, this has been an area of focus since the recent 
financial crisis. 
The structure of this dissertation has been designed to efficiently develop the 
research objectives, creating and testing hypothesises based on the previous 
research. This will first focus on critically reviewing the literature on corporate 
governance, ESG, voluntary disclosure, ownership and firm performance. Then 
from the literature review I will develop multiple hypotheses that reflect the 
gaps in the previous research. The methodology will then explain how the 
research was carried out, including the regression models, analysis tools and 
methods used in the research.  
The analysis of the results will then revealing the connections between the 
variable, allowing for the possible supporting of my hypothesis. This will then 
be compared with the results from previous research, to identify similarities 
or conflicting arguments. Then summarise the conclusion of the research, 
recommendations and further research. 
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1.1: Background of Situation 
 
In the recent years, the world’s financial markets have witnessed the 
introduction of  environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors as 
potentially key factors for the investment decision making process (Bianchi et 
al., 2010). The ESG of a company has become increasingly important to 
investors, considering the potential financial impact from these non-financial 
performances. ESG is currently a popular topic in literature, it can be used to 
analysis how ethically a company is run, and this is becoming more important 
for the ethical investor. Investors are looking for more than just profits they 
are looking for an ethical investment avoiding the “sin” stocks.  Responsible 
investing has been defined within the realms of socially responsible investing, 
ethical investments and corporate social performance (Bianchi et al., 2010). 
This paper will be looking at the Bloomberg disclosure score, which does not 
reflect the company’s levels of ESG performance but the level at which they 
disclose information about ESG. This could be a good indication of the 
structure of the company and potential future performance.  The ownership 
can be a critical factor when considering this voluntary disclosure, determining 
the focus and the level of regulation. Government, pension and insurance 
owned companies will be more heavily regulated and so in turn should return 
a higher ESG disclosure score.  
There is also a increasing interest in the corporate governance and how this 
influences the sustainability and financial performance of a company. The 
corporate governance system controls how a company is directed and 
controlled, influencing the company’s ability to meet its objectives. This is 
defined by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) as a way that investors in the company 
can have confidence that they will get a return on their investment. There is a 
larger portion of the prior literature on the relationship between corporate 
governance and company performance that documents a significantly positive 
association between corporate governance and firm value (e.g., Chaghadari 
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and Chaleshtori, 2011; Ammann et al., 2011). However the results for the 
individual characteristics of governance have mixed results. 
An important part of corporate governance is the board of directors. The 
principle role of a board of directors is to represent the shareholder’s needs, 
ensuring that the organisation operates in their best interests. They are a 
crucial part of a company, developing the management system that reflects 
the company’s corporate governance goals. The directors can be put into two 
categories executive directors and independent directors. This paper will be 
looking at multiple factors such as board size, number of board meetings and 
percentage of independent directors. Analysing how these variables influence 
the performance of a company and also the ESG disclosure. 
There is a large amount of research into different determinates of firm 
performance, for example research by Ammann, Oesch, and Schmid (2011), 
Brown and Caylor (2009), Chaghadari and Chaleshtori, (2011).  They compare 
the different corporate governance characteristic or voluntary disclosure to 
performance indicators such as ROA, ROE and TobinQ. There is a large mixture 
of results, some finding positive, negative or no correlation between variable. 
There are many studies ﬁnd that ﬁrm performance is negatively related to 
board size and positively to percentage of independent directors, while others 
present contradicting evidence. 
For Example, the research by Fooladi (2012) compared corporate governance 
with firm performance using factors such as board size and independent 
director, but found no significant correlation. Their research shows that there 
should be a correlation, but their paper was unable to find a significant result.  
This research will be similar to Fooladi (2012) looking at board characteristics 
such as independence and board size, however I will be including other factors 
such as ESG disclosure, similar to  Eng and Mak (2003) that compared 
corporate governance and firm performance with company voluntary 
disclosure. Then using a larger sample of companies from multiple markets, 
ESG Disclosure, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance:  
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and carefully selected analysis techniques, hopefully expand upon the 
previous research.  
 
1.2: Justification for Research 
 
This research will be expanding on the current literature, by including the ESG 
disclosure variable and analysing a different data set. This will further research 
the mixed finding in the connection between corporate governance and 
performance. Testing the hypothesis questions designed within this paper to 
develop evidence to supporting my research objectives.  
This large data set will be collected from five markets the UK, Germany, France, 
Japan and the US with 4480 observations. The factors that I will be considering 
are percentage of independent directors, board size, firm size (Market 
Capitalisation), board meetings, ownership and ESG disclosure. I will collect 
all the information from Bloomberg, and using panel data analyse run 
regressions to determine if there is any correlation between the different 
factors and the firm performance. I will then use relevant theory to explain my 
findings, and explain why they are correlated to the performance.  
There are many factors that influence a firm’s performance both financial and 
non-financial, which can have a positive or negative effect.  The objective of 
this dissertation is to analyse the data to determine the correlation between 
independent directors, board size, ownership, ESG disclosure and the firm 
performance. Eccles et al. (2011) analysed the U.S. market interest in non-
financial information, finding the top five were ESG disclosure score, board 
size, the number of Board Meetings per year and percentage of independent 
directors. These factors are important non-financial factors that I believe have 
a strong connection to the company’s performance. 
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1.3: Research Objectives 
 
 
1. Determine if there is any correlation between the ESG disclosure score 
and the firm’s performance. 
 
2. Determine if board size, board meeting and independent directors are 
connected to the firm’s performance. 
 
 
3. Determine if there is any connection between ownership and ESG 
disclosure score. 
 
4. Determine if there is any connection between independent directors and 
ESG disclosure score. 
 
5. Determine if there is any connection between board size and ESG 
disclosure score. 
 
6. Test the hypothesis against a large panel data set, from the UK, France, 
Germany, Japan and the US.  
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Chapter 2: Critical Literature Review 
 
 
This chapter will discuss and review the relevant literature to this dissertation 
research.  There has been many studies in the UK, US, Asia and Europe 
researching the connection between firm’s ownership, board size, voluntary 
disclosure,  percentage of independent directors and how they relate to the 
firm’s performance (Ho and Tower, 2011; Habbash et al., 2014). These are 
non-financial factors that could reflect a firm’s future performance by 
indicating an effective management structure and efficient cash flows. 
The previous research on corporate governance has found varied results for 
the connection between board independency, board size and firm 
performance, reviewed in section 2.1. These findings show that there is a need 
for further research in this area, broadening the research scope to include 
other variables and different samples.  
The world’s financial market has had an increasing interest in company 
transparency about ESG performance and policies, this transparency can be 
demonstrated by the Bloomberg disclosure scores (Eccles et al., 2011). This 
area of study is new and has not been full researched, however there has been 
lots of research in voluntary disclosure and ESG performance but there is little 
research focused on ESG disclosure.  
All the variables of a firm are affected by the ownership, from the corporate 
governance to the disclosure of information. This will need to be considered 
as it could have a strong connection to the considered variables. Which 
performance measures are most appropriate will also be crucial to the 
findings. This review of current literature will reveal the expected connection 
between the variables and allow the creation of the theoretical model.  
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2.1: Corporate governance 
 
The corporate governance of a company is an important role in the 
development of the management structure, improving cash flow and reducing 
the cost of capital. Corporate governance is defined by Dalei et al. (2012, 
p.196) as the “ way of bringing the interests of investors and managers into 
line and ensuring that firms are run for the benefit of investors”.  This 
demonstrates how important a company’s approach to corporate governance 
can be to the owners, or potential investors reflecting the firms risk and 
potential future earnings.  
The majority of the prior literature on the connection between company 
performance and corporate governance demonstrates that better corporate 
governance can be associated with a better company performance. Tian and 
Twite (2011) discuss the increasing amount of empirical literature on the 
connection between corporate governance and firm performance, and how 
investors interpret this connection. An example of this connection, Brown and 
Caylor (2009) found that in the U.S. better governed firms have superior ROE, 
ROA and Tobin’s Q. The implementation of a good corporate governance 
structure can have a positive effect on the firm’s performance. However the 
company may need to consider if the financial cost outweigh the benefits 
associated in the implementation of effective governance system.  
The quality of a company’s corporate governance has been proven as an 
effective method to prevent management opportunistic behaviour; which can 
then improve the financial performance (Habbash et al., 2014). While Black et 
al. (2006) claimed that there is no strong evidence that better governed firms 
are more profitable. Whereas Ammanna et al. (2011) research results found 
that good corporate governance practices are reflected in a company’s notably 
high market value. 
The main empirical research of corporate governance use similar variables to 
characterise how well the corporate governance is implemented. Tian and 
Twite (2011) suggest the main four are; managerial compensation, 
ESG Disclosure, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance:  
Empirical evidence from UK, France, Germany, Japan and US markets 2008-2012. 
 
U0941699 Page 8  
 
shareholders rights, ownership structure and board characteristics. Whereas 
Chaghadari and Chaleshtori (2011) decide on CEO duality, independency of 
the board, board size and ownership structure. The research by Eccles et al. 
(2011) found the board characteristics that the U.S. investors were most 
interested were the number of board meetings per year, board size and the 
percentage of independent directors. 
An important element of corporate governance was the introduction of the 
board of directors, as they align the managers and the interests of 
shareholders, reducing the separation of ownership and control (Habbash et 
al., 2014). There are multiple board characteristics that can be considered, the 
literature has identified a focus on the board size and percentage of 
independent directors. There is a range of research into the connection 
between board characteristics and firm value or performance, with some 
conflicting views.  
 
2.1.1 Independent directors 
The board of directors is considered to be a crucial instrument for supervising 
the organisations management, so the independency of board members has 
become a much debated issue. An independent director is a member of a 
board of directors that do not have any financial association with the company, 
so they do not own shares in the company (Eng and Mak, 2003). Fama and 
Jensen (1983) explain how independent or outside directors will have the 
incentive for showing expert decision control as they are developing 
reputation, leading to improved supervision and governance. An example, 
Zubaidah (2009) research argues that the board with more independent 
directors can better control any opportunistic behaviour of managers, this will 
protect the shareholders’ interests much better than a board with more 
dependent members. 
The current trend for most organisations is to have a majority of independent 
directors, and an increasing number have only one or two inside directors 
ESG Disclosure, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance:  
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(Crespí-Cladera and Pascual-Fuster, 2013). This reflects the conventional 
wisdom that only independent directors can be effective at monitoring 
management, one of the principal roles of the board (Bhagat and Black, 2001). 
The better supervision should help better align the objectives of the 
management and the investors improving the performance. The research by 
Borokhovich et al. (1996) supports this finding that more board independence 
can improve performance and value. 
The literature debates the relationship between the percentage of independent 
directors and a firm’s performance, with arguments for positive, negative or 
no correlation (Yasser et al., 2011). The empirical results are surprisingly 
mixed, for instance Sami et al. (2011), Bonn (2004), Cho and Rui (2007) found 
that there is a significant positive relationship between the percentage of 
independent directors and firm performance. While Fooladi (2011) and Malik 
(2012) found no significant relationship between independent directors, 
however they were expecting to find a positive relationship from their research 
in the literature. Whereas Bhagat and Black, (2001) and Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008) found a practically strong inverse correlation between board 
independence and firm performance. This challenges the conventional 
wisdom about independent directors. 
The complex mixed findings suggest that independent directors are a good 
measure of corporate governance, but can this reflect financial performance. 
The research by Crespí-Cladera and Pascual-Fuster (2013) investigates the 
importance of the level of independence of independent directors. This could 
explain why the results are so mixed, as in some of the observations might 
have high percentage of independent directors but how independent are they. 
This could be included in further research to expand the findings.  
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2.1.2 Board size 
There has been lots of research into the influence of the board size on a 
corporate financial performance. The papers by Guest (2009), Cater et al. 
(2003) found a negative connection between board size and financial 
performance, meaning that larger boards can have a negative effect on firm 
performance.  Jensen (1993) explains that keeping boards small helps to 
improve the performance, keeping them less than eight members helps the 
CEO control them that should have a positive impact on financial performance.  
The literature discusses two main sources of the effect of board size, as the 
group size increases the board control management decreases and problems 
develop in communication and coordination (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; 
Eisenberg et al., 1998). Researchers in many disciplines have explored the 
effect of group size on group performance, finding larger groups find it harder 
to come to a collective decision, with reduced communication and 
coordination. This can then be reflected in the board room environment, with 
the CEO trying to lead the group, so larger groups will find it harder to meet 
an optimum decision (Jensen, 1993).   
There are lots of examples of empirical evidence that support the board size 
effect, with multiple studies showing a significantly negative relationship 
between board size and firm performance. The regression results from Guest 
(2009) show a significant negative relationship between firm board size and 
profitability, the larger boards appear to have lower TOBINQ. The results of 
Cater et al. (2003) also showed a significantly negative correlation between 
board size and TOBINQ. However Bermig and Frick (2010) found insignificant 
coefficients of board size with ROC and ROE but a positive with TobinQ, 
suggesting that it is completely irrelevant in this respect.   
The general findings are that smaller boards around seven to nine have a 
higher performance. Jensen (1993) recommends board size of seven or eight 
directors, whilst Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argues that eight or nine is the best 
possible board size. Some researchers have challenged these arguments, 
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finding that performance of more complex organisations increases with 
increased board size (Coles et al., 2008). 
The main characteristics of corporate governance this paper will be analysing 
are board size and percentage of independent directors.  The literature has 
revealed mixed result for the correlation between the characteristics and 
performance, showing that the area could be further researched. I will be 
looking to see if there is a correlation between the board size, independent 
directors and firm performance. Table 2.1 below shows the different results 
of the authors.  
 
Table 2.1.1 Author findings Correlation Authors 
Independent Directors 
(more independence)  
Positive Borokhovich et al. (1996)  
Sami et al. (2011) 
Bonn (2004) 
Cho and Rui (2007) 
None  Malik (2012) 
Chaghadari and Chaleshtori 
(2011) 
Fooladi (2011) 
Negative Bhagat and Black, (2001) 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) 
Board Size  
(larger boards) 
Positive Coles et al. (2008) For complex 
firms 
None  Fooladi (2011) 
Bermig and Frick (2010) 
Chaghadari and Chaleshtori 
(2011) 
Negative Cater et al. (2003) 
Guest (2009) 
Tian and Twite (2011) 
 
 
 
ESG Disclosure, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance:  
Empirical evidence from UK, France, Germany, Japan and US markets 2008-2012. 
 
U0941699 Page 12  
 
2.2: ESG and Voluntary Disclose 
The voluntary reporting of environmental, social and governance (ESG) is used 
to describe the formal corporate reporting that is extra to the published 
financial reports that are required by their accounting standards. There is an 
increasing amount of firms that have started to voluntarily publish there ESG 
performance in standalone reports (Murphy and McGrath, 2013). This 
indicates that corporations have recognised the importance of voluntarily 
disclosing their ESG performances. 
2.2.1 Environmental, Social and Governance Disclosure 
The global financial markets have been moving towards investment models 
that incorporate environmental and social dimensions (Cadman, 2011). The 
ESG disclosure score represents the amount of environmental, social and 
governance data that is voluntarily disclosed by the company.  ESG disclosure 
is an important variable because it helps a company demonstrate that it is 
managing its risks and has a track record of monitoring its ESG performance. 
Koehler and Hespenheide (2013) did research to see if there is evidence that 
ESG information matters to investors, finding companies disclosing more ESG 
information are more likely to enjoy a lower cost of capital. 
Companies approach ESG are reporting their performance in a variety of 
different ways, making it hard for comparison this is why they need a regulated 
unified measure of ESG performance (Koehler and Hespenheide, 2013). The 
concept of ESG disclosure allows the investor access to additional relevant 
information about the companies ESG performance, enabling investors to 
better understand the risks and opportunities (Bassen and Kovacs, 2008). 
There have been many examples of corporate problems that relate to ESG 
issues, including fraud, corruption, environmental accidents and health and 
safety failures (Peiris and Evans, 2010). These can arise due to the 
management pursuing their own interests, not those of the stakeholders. 
Previous research into ESG has shown the industry specific nature, with some 
industries having high ESG and high returns, and others having low ESG high 
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returns (Manescu, 2011). When Bloomberg is calculating its ESG disclosure 
scores it takes into account the industry as it is a strong influence to the types 
and levels of disclosure (Bloomberg, 2014).s 
There is an increasing market interest in the level of a corporate   transparency 
about its ESG performance and policies. These can be reported using annual 
reports or addition ESG reports that are available on research platforms like 
Bloomberg. Young (2013) researched institutional investor’s behaviour 
towards responsible investment in connection to ESG performance showing 
the need for better disclosure. The increasing investor curiosity about 
corporate social responsibility and the growing interest in companies ESG 
disclosure scores suggests an increasing number of investors using ESG 
transparency as a proxy for the management’s efficiency and transparency 
(Eccles et al., 2011). There is also a strong connection between the evolution 
responsible investment and the ESG and sustainable development of a 
company (Cadman, 2011).  
The ESG information can help responsible investors make more informed 
decisions, so they will look at companies that disclose more information as 
they will be easily analysed. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) researched the 
investment in the sector of sin stocks, which are publicly traded companies 
involved in the production of alcohol, tobacco and gambling finding their 
earnings are statistically significant excess return. These stocks can have 
abnormally high returns but can have negative ESG performance, and avoided 
by ethical investor (Cadman, 2011).  This could reflect the different 
percentages of ownership. For example government, pensions and insurance 
companies will avoid investing ‘sin’ stocks, whereas some investors will seek 
higher returns regardless of responsible investing.  
The question is can the Bloomberg ESG discloser score be used as a valid 
indicator that reflects the firms performance? The investors can use both 
financial and non-financial information, this can also reflects the investors 
need for the ethical investor.  Recent investment practices are becoming more 
concerned with ESG information, with the need for more socially responsible 
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investing (Manescu, 2011). Some authors argue that ethical portfolios tend to 
underperform over the long term due to a lack of diversification (Markowitz, 
1952). An opposite view is that ethical investment has a positive impact on 
the bottom line of an organisation and market performance (Abramson and 
Chung, 2000). 
Companies are developing better ESG disclosure; this could be because they 
have started to see advantages such as reputation and protection or this could 
be improved regulations. Murphy and McGrath (2013) argued in their research 
that some of the motivation for corporations to improve ESG reporting and 
disclosures is to avoid the risk of lawsuit or class actions that can have severe 
financial penalties. Government ownership will have restriction for companies 
that will mandate the levels of ESG and disclosure whereas individual investors 
might not have as strong restrictions, as they could be more interested in the 
financial performance. 
The main challenge with mainstreaming ESG information is that investors 
perceive them as complex and difficult to integrate into investment decisions. 
The complexity involved with the inconsistency and insufficiencies of ESG 
disclosure has moved to investors treating them as compliance rather than the 
ESG material factors (IFAC, 2012). The ESG disclosure score could be used to 
illustrate to investors the level of corporate compliance that could reflect 
possible future sustainability and performance. A positive ESG reputation can 
provide protection, for when things go wrong, preventing drops in shareholder 
value, with disclosure of ESG performance information providing good 
company transparency (Koehler and Hespenheide, 2013). There is also 
Cadman (2011) that follows the assumptions that the accountability, 
transparency and ESG disclosure are just part of responsible corporate and 
financial behaviour. 
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2.2.2 Voluntary Disclosure 
 
Modern investors are risk adverse and want to diversify their portfolio gaining 
the highest return at lowest risk. They are looking for more information when 
analysing investment options, including financial and non-financial. The type 
of information that is disclosed or not disclosed can also be an indicator to 
investors, although some is a legal requirement some is voluntary. For 
example the level of voluntary disclosure by companies in China has received 
considerable attention in the accounting literature especially since the 1997 
Asian financial crisis (Ho and Tower, 2011). Some research has found 
companies that have more voluntary disclosures tend to produce a better 
stock price compared to the future earnings of the company (García-Meca and 
Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010). 
Voluntary disclosure has a strong connection to research in corporate 
governance and ownership, but the opinions on the connection are mixed. Eng 
and Mak (2003) researched whether corporate governance is correlated to 
voluntary disclosure, with a focus on the connection between board 
composition, ownership structure, government ownership and voluntary 
disclosure. García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2010) findings showed that 
independent boards are associated with higher voluntary disclosure. Whereas 
Ho and Tower (2011) found that board independence remains to be a non-
significant predictor of voluntary disclosure.  
Previous studies have measured the levels of corporate disclosure by using 
disclosure indexes or scores that are developed to measure voluntary 
disclosure in company’s financial statements (Eng and Mak, 2003). This paper 
will be doing a similar research but using the ESG disclosure score from 
Bloomberg to represent the transparency of the company. The voluntary 
disclosure of ESG information will be affected by multiple factors such as 
ownership, corporate governance, country and industry. 
The literature on ESG and voluntary disclosure has demonstrated the need for 
increased levels of disclosure and the advantages and disadvantages. The 
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transparency of the company information can be just as important as the 
information it self. There has been an increase in the research of ESG, but the 
connection between ESG disclosure and firm performance has not been full 
researched.  
 
2.3: Ownership 
 
There is a range of research on the area of ownership and the effect on firm’s 
management and performance. For example, Greenwood and Thesmar (2011) 
researched the effect of ownership on the volatility of the share price and 
earnings. Xu and Wang (1999) explored whether the ownership structure of 
China’s publicly listed significantly affects the performance. García-Meca and 
Sánchez-Ballesta (2010) looked at the association between ownership and 
corporate voluntary disclosure, finding that diffused ownership structure 
creates an incentive for the company to disclose extra information to 
stakeholders. 
Government ownership can increases moral hazard and agency problems, 
however disclosure can be used to suppress these problems (Eng and Mak, 
2003). Ho and Tower (2011) state that a significant shareholdings by 
institutional investors can help to create strong incentives to monitor 
corporate disclosure practices, hypothesising that the degree of voluntary 
disclosure is positively associated with a higher proportion of institutional 
ownership. Xu and Wang (1999) state that the when most the owners of a 
company are corporations TobinQ is higher, whereas when mostly individual 
owners the TobinQ the accounting profit rates are significantly lower. 
The ownership of a company can affect their objectives for example individual 
investor want profit whereas government might have other goals. Xu and Wang 
(1999) explain how the government may have more political objectives rather 
than just maximising profit, such as improving employment or deducing 
inflation. There are studies finding that clashes between the government and 
shareholders objectives can lead to company inefficiency. 
ESG Disclosure, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance:  
Empirical evidence from UK, France, Germany, Japan and US markets 2008-2012. 
 
U0941699 Page 17  
 
The majority of the literature on the connection between the ownership and 
performance look at ownership concentration, CEO ownership, shares owned 
by management and government ownership (Demsetz, and Villalonga, 2001; 
Xu and Wang 1999).  Ho and Tower (2011) addressed three ownership groups 
for their research family controlled, local institutional controlled, and foreign 
controlled. Demsetz, and Villalonga (2001) used the percentage owned by the 
five largest shareholders and the percentage of shares owned by the 
management, Whereas Xu and Wang (1999) used the ownership mix and 
concentration for their ownership measures. 
This research will be different as I will be using the percentages of ownership 
for five different types of owner:  Government, Advisor, Pension, Insurance 
and Individual. This should provide more information on the effect of different 
types of ownership structures on performance. 
2.4: Measuring Firm Performance 
 
There are multiple Indicators used to reflect the firm’s performance, each 
linked to different parts of the financial operation or successes of the 
company.  Previous empirical research on the subject of corporate governance 
use either accounting based or market based measure to indicate the firm 
performance (Chaghadari and Chaleshtori, 2011).  The book value measures 
ROA and ROE these are frequently used for short term measures of operating 
performance, whereas the market value to book value measure Tobin’s Q is 
the widely used for the long term indicator for firm valuation. Tobin’s Q is 
connected to the market so is influenced by investors psychology and 
interpretation of forecasting world events and business strategies. 
Ammann et al. (2011) use the TobinQ performance measure in there research 
as it provides a good indication of the firm’s market value. Epps & Cereola 
(2008) measure the operating performance of a company using the return on 
assets (ROA) ratio as it is demonstrates the level of earning that has been 
generated from the invested assets. Brown and Caylor (2009) and Chaghadari 
and Chaleshtori (2011) use ROA and ROE to access how well the company’s 
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corporate governance is at successfully controlling the management, to 
effectively gain a higher return on invested assets. Sami et al. (2011) uses 
ROA, ROE and TobinQ, whereas Cho and Rui (2007) just use TobinQ. 
 
Table 2.4.1 Different measures   Performance Measure 
Authors ROA ROE ROC TobinQ 
Brown and Caylor (2009)      
Chaghadari and Chaleshtori (2011)     
Sami et al. (2011)     
Cho and Rui (2007)     
Bhagat and Bolton (2008)     
Bermig and Frick (2010)     
Guest (2009)     
Tian and Twite (2011)     
Ammann et al. (2011) 
 
   
 
The previous research demonstrates a range of performance measures that 
can be used to test against corporate governance. The main measures that are 
used are TobinQ and ROA with some using ROE, However only one author from 
my research used return on capital. This is interesting as previous authors 
have been focused on return on assets, equity and market to book value not 
the return on capital invested.  
In this paper, I extend the current literature by using a larger sample of more 
recent data and testing against four different performance measures ROA, 
ROC, ROE and Tobin’s Q. This should produce findings that will contribute to 
the current literature. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Orientation and 
Research 
3.1: Methodology 
This chapter will discuss the research methodology, also a reviews panel data 
and regression analysis then developing the research hypothesis model.  This 
dissertation will be similar to other research on the connection between firm 
performance and corporate governance; however I will be looking at two main 
areas, ESG disclosure and corporate governance. This analyse will involve 
collecting a relevant panel of variables then using analysis software running 
multi-linier regressions, this will reveal any correlations. The results from the 
regressions will then be analysed and interpreted relating to the previous 
literature, to test the hypothesis and find recommendations. 
This research will be using secondary data for a quantitative empirical 
analysis. The reason for using secondary quantitative data is because it is the 
only way to possibly gather this amount of data needed for this statistical 
analysis. This research will use multi-dimensional panel data, both time series 
and cross sectional, over a five year period for 896 companies. This data will 
then be analysed using Eview 7, a statistical package used for time-series 
econometric analysis. This will allow me to test the regression models on the 
sample data. 
The data was collected from the Bloomberg terminal, using excel to download 
the data into the model so that it can be entered into the regression software 
easily. The data was downloaded from Bloomberg using excel because it is the 
most accurate and convenient way to collect the 4480 observations. The data 
should be reliable as it was collect form a secondary source Bloomberg, this 
will reduce the chances of getting incorrect results. The only limitation in 
collecting the data is the ownership variables, as there is no way of 
downloading the past years ownership percentages only the current. So this 
research will use the current ownership for all five years, this will reduce the 
accuracy but should still indicate any correlation.   
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3.2: Panel Data, Linear regression and Correlation Research 
 
The data analysis section of this research will involve the comparison of 
quantitative data and statistics, revealing the connection between the 
established variables. Linear regressions analysis is a method that can be used 
to determine the relationship or correlation between two different variables. 
The use of multi-linear regressions allows us to find the connection between 
multiple independent variables and the dependent variable. The regression 
will reveal any connection between a dependent variable and the independent 
variables.  
There are three different outcomes from the regression, positive, negative or 
no correlation between the variables. Positive correlation means that when one 
variable increases so does the other and negative correlation means that they 
move in opposite directions.  
Panel data is used for financial modelling which comprises of both time series 
and cross-sectional elements, keeping the same entries and measures for 
some qualities over time (Brooks, 2008) 
 
𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝒙𝒊𝒕 + 𝒖𝒊𝒕 
 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable, α is the intercept term, β is a k*1vector of 
the parameters to be estimated on the explanatory variables, the 𝑢 represents 
the error term. 
The use of panel data gives more useful result data with less collinearity 
between the different variables, generally described as being more 
appropriate and efficient for multidimensional analyse . Panel data is better 
able to identify some connections that are not noticeable in simply cross-
section or time-series data analysis (Baltagi, 2005). The most common method 
used is known as ordinary least squares (OLS) this is the foundation of 
econometric model estimation. 
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Hypothesis Testing 
 
In hypothesis testing analyse, there is at all times two hypotheses, they are 
known as the null hypothesis denoted H0 and the alternative hypothesis 
denoted H1. When testing a hypothesis you are actually testing the null 
hypothesis, the result of this will then indicate the result for the H1 hypothesis. 
This is because the rejection of the null hypothesis will then support the 
alternative hypothesis as this represents the remaining result of interest.  The 
acceptance or rejection of a hypothesis depends on if the analysis result 
accepts H0 or rejects H0, acceptance of H0 means that H1 (your hypothesis) 
is rejected.  
For example:   H0: β = 0.8 
H1: β > 0.8 
Here the null hypothesis is that the β is equal to 0.8 is being tested against a 
one-sided alternative that the β is greater than 0.8. 
 
Test of Significance  
 
The level of significance that you choose to use reflects the level of accuracy, 
the standard used is less than 5% then even better the 1% significance level.  
This 5% significance level means that there is a 95% confidence interval. Some 
decide to use the 5% but a potential problem is that if the sample size is 
sufficiently large any null hypothesis can be rejected. This can be over looked 
in some empirical works this is why some econometricians suggest the 1% to 
be used on larger samples (Brook, 2008). This is why my research will be 
looking at both the 5% and 1%, as I have a large sample size. 
Figure 1 shows the rejection regions for a one sided 5% hypothesis test.  If the 
result of the regression has a probability less than the 5% then the null 
hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level. The rejection of the null hypothesis 
result at this level would be ‘statistically significant’.  If the null hypothesis is 
not rejected, it would be said that the result of the test is ‘not significant’, or 
you could say it is ‘insignificant’ (Brooks, 2008). 
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Figure 1 (Brooks, 2008, pp. 57) 
 
Correlation Coefficientf 
The correlation coefficient can indicate an association between two variables, 
but does not explain the relationship between then.  Thus if we state that x 
and z are correlated, this does not imply that changes in z cause changes x, 
or x causes changes in z. There is just evidence that there is a linear 
relationship between x and z, and their movements are on average related by 
the amount represented by the correlation coefficient (Brooks, 2008). This 
needs to be considered when analysing the results, as we will be able to see if 
the variables are connected but are unable to identify how they influence each 
other. For example does ESG affect the firm’s performance or does the firm’s 
performance affect the ESG. 
Balance and Unbalanced Data 
The distinction should be made to decide whether panel data is balanced or 
unbalanced. A balanced panel has the same number of time-series 
observations for each of the cross sectional units. An unbalanced panel will 
have less observations for some of the cross sectional elements. Incomplete 
panels are more likely to be the norm in typical economic empirical situations 
(Baltagi, 2005). This research will be an unbalanced panel as some of the data 
will be missing because it is unavailable. This will be automatically accounted 
for by the software package when running the analysis. 
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Fixed Effects and Random Effect 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) is the simplest estimation model used in the 
regression analysis. There are two further approaches to panel estimators that 
are used in financial research, the fixed effect models and random effect 
models. In fact, the fixed versus random effects issue has caused lots of 
debates in the statistics literature and also the panel data econometrics 
literature (Baltagi, 2005). The fixed effect model is the simplest, allowing the 
intercept in the model move on the cross-section but not over time, with the 
slope estimates are fixed for over time and cross-section.  
 
The random effect model the same as the fixed effect approach proposes 
different intercept terms for each entity that are constant over time. However, 
the random effect model has the intercept for each of the cross-sectional unit 
is assumed to come from a common α (Brook, 2008). The common intercept 
is the same for all cross-sections and over time. 
The likelihood test for fixed effects is done this will then show if the panel 
data approach or OLS is the most appropriate. Then the Hausman test can be 
used to test if the fixed effect or random effect model is the most appropriate 
for the model.  
 
OLS, Fixed or Random Effect Tests 
When completing the regressions the option for OLS, fixed or random need to 
be determined this is done using the Likelihood ratio test and Hausman test 
for random effects 
The Likelihood ratio is a test to determine whether to use an OLS model or the 
panel data approach. For example below are the results from a fixed effect 
test.  The fixed effect test result has a p-value less than 1% indicating that we 
reject the null hypothesis H0 and accept H1 panel data approach, fixed and 
random effect. If this null hypothesis is not rejected, the data can simply be 
pooled together and OLS employed. The next step will be to do the Hausman 
test. 
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The specification test was proposed by Hausman in 1978, this test was based 
on the difference between the fixed and random effects estimators (Baltagi, 
2005). Hausman test is a statistical hypothesis test that is used to differentiate 
between which model to use from the random effect or fixed effect.  
 
This is demonstrated below, testing a random effect model and see if it passes 
the Hausman test for random effects being uncorrelated with explanatory 
variables.  If the p- value is less than 1% this will indicate that the fixed effect 
model is not appropriate then run the test for the fixed effect model.  
 
Table 3.2.2 Example Hausman Test  
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: ESGALL   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 44.188418 10 0.0000 
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2.1 Example likelihood Test   
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: FIRMEQ1ROA   
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 4.674187 (4,1949) 0.0009 
Period Chi-square 18.789036 4 0.0009 
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Multicollinearity 
When using OLS estimation method there is an assumption that is made that 
the explanatory variables are not correlated with each other. Multicollinearity 
occurs when there is a strong correlation between two or more of the variable 
(Brooks, 2008). The Pearson Correlation will show the coefficients between 
each of the variables, indicating any significant correlations between the 
independent variables. If there is a non-negligible relationship between two or 
more of the explanatory variables this is called near multicollinearity. When 
this happens it can cause the regression to become very sensitive to small 
changes in the model, so adding or removing explanatory variables can lead 
to large changes in the significance and the coefficients (Brooks, 2008).   
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3.3: Research Hypothesis Model Specification 
 
The literature review has provided multiple possible research ideas. This 
research will look at the relationship between multiple different variables and 
firm performance and ESG disclosure, they are hypothesized as follows: 
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between ESG disclosure score and the 
firm performance. 
H2: There is a negative relationship between the board size, board 
meetings and the firm performance. 
H3: There is a positive relationship between percentage of independent 
directors and the firm performance. 
H4: There is a relationship between the ownership and the ESG disclosure 
scores.  
H5: There is a relationship between the percentage of Independent 
directors and the ESG disclosure scores.  
H6: There is a relationship between the board size and the ESG disclosure 
scores. 
 
This research will look at different factors that could possibly have a 
correlation to a firm’s performance.  I will be focusing corporate governance, 
ownership and ESG Disclosure scores, the variables associated with these 
factors should have a strong influence on a company’s performance.  
I will be using a statistical method widely used in social science, panel data 
analysis. This is data collected over time then using a model similar to the one 
below to run regressions this will allow us to find the results. 
𝒚 = 𝒂 + 𝒃𝑿 + 𝒄𝑿 + 𝒅𝑿 
First test 
𝑬𝑺𝑮 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆 = 𝑪𝒐𝒓𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 + 𝑭𝒊𝒓𝒎 𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒄𝒆 + 𝑶𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 
Then test 
𝑭𝒊𝒓𝒎 𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 = 𝑪𝒐𝒓𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 + 𝑬𝑺𝑮 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆 + 𝑶𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 
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The Test Equations: OLS Regressions 
 
ESGit = α+ ROAit + Countryit + Industryit+ leverageit +lnmktcapit+  
pctindepdirectorit+ Boardsizeit+ Boardmit +Indepattit +Govoit +Advoit 
+Peoit +Insoit +Individualoit 
 
ESGit = α+ + ROCit + Countryit + Industryit+ leverageit +lnmktcapit+  
pctindepdirectorit+ Boardsizeit+ Boardmit +Indepattit +Govoit +Advoit 
+Peoit +Insoit +Individualoit 
 
ESGit = α+ ROEit + + Countryit + Industryit+ leverageit +lnmktcapit+  
pctindepdirectorit+ Boardsizeit+ Boardmit +Indepattit +Govoit +Advoit 
+Peoit +Insoit +Individualoit 
 
ESGit = α + TobinQit + Countryit + Industryit+ leverageit +lnmktcapit+  
pctindepdirectorit+ Boardsizeit+ Boardmit +Indepattit +Govoit +Advoit 
+Peoit +Insoit +Individualoit 
 
ROAit = α+ ESGit + Countryit + Industryit+ leverageit +lnmktcapit  
+ pctindepdirectorit + Boardsizeit + Boardmit +Indepattit +Govoit 
+Advoit +Peoit +Insoit +Individualoit 
 
ROE = α+ ESGit + Countryit + Industryit+ leverageit +lnmktcapit +  
 pctindepdirectorit + Boardsizeit + Boardmit +Indepattit +Govoit +Advoit  
 +Peoit +Insoit +Individualoit 
 
ROC = α+ ESGit + Countryit + Industryit+ leverageit +lnmktcapit +  
 pctindepdirectorit + Boardsizeit + Boardmit +Indepattit +Govoit +Advoit  
 +Peoit +Insoit +Individualoit 
 
TobinQ α+ ESGit + Countryit + Industryit+ leverageit +lnmktcapit +  
pctindepdirectorit + Boardsizeit + Boardmit +Indepattit +Govoit +Advoit 
+Peoit +Insoit +Individualoit 
 
(Company) i = 1, . . . , N;  (Time)t = 1, ..., T 
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The test equations above should provide the results needed to test the 
hypothesis, by determining the connection between the dependent variables 
and the independent variables. The literature review identified that firm 
performance can be measured in many different ways, so for robust testing I 
will use four different measures ROA, ROC, ROE and TobinQ.  The equations 
for the ESG disclosure regressions have just one of the performance indicators 
in at a time, so there will be four, one for each indicator. This is done because 
in econometric when running regressions the variables need to be 
independent, however these performance indicators will be connected as they 
have similar traits.   
The data will be downloaded and organised then imported into Eview, the 
statistical software package, and then check for the descriptive statistics of 
the data. This will show averages, min and max that can be used to identify if 
the data complies with your expectations. For example, you can identify the 
range of percentages of independent directors in the data set. The Pearson 
Correlation can also be used to check for multicollinearity within the variables.    
When the data has been accepted, then I can start running the multiple 
regressions using the test equations above. The models will also need to be 
tested to see whether the OLS, fixed or random effect model is most 
appropriate. Then when the data is all finalised it will be exported individually 
to Excel and organised into tables together ready for analyse. The statistically 
significant coefficients need to be identified to the levels of significance 5% 
and 1%. These results will then be interpreted in connection to my 
hypothesises developed in this section.   
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Chapter 4: Results and Analysis 
 
In this section, the relevance of the data collected for the analysis and the 
results from the regressions and tests are analysed. The results will be 
analysed along with the literature from chapter two, connecting the findings 
with previous research. This will then generate a better understanding of the 
relationship between ESG disclosure, corporate governance and firm 
performance. 
 
This research has been designed to test the following hypothesis: 
 
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between ESG disclosure score and the 
firm performance. 
H2: There is a negative relationship between the board size, board 
meetings and the firm performance. 
H3: There is a positive relationship between percentage of independent 
directors and the firm performance. 
H4: There is a relationship between the ownership and the ESG disclosure 
scores.  
H5: There is a relationship between the percentage of Independent 
directors and the ESG disclosure scores.  
H6: There is a relationship between the board size and the ESG disclosure 
scores. 
 
4.1: Data Collection 
 
Secondary data was collected using the Bloomberg terminal, this was used to 
create the quantitative analysis of the variables. These variable were chosen 
based on the findings in chapter 2 and 3.  I designed a model in Excel to 
download the data for all the tickers, using Excel formulas =BDH (Bloomberg 
Data History) and =BDP (Bloomberg Data Point) then formatting the data in the 
correct layout to enter into Eview. Appendix 1 shows a sample of the model. 
  
ESG Disclosure, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance:  
Empirical evidence from UK, France, Germany, Japan and US markets 2008-2012. 
 
U0941699 Page 30  
 
The data was collected from the Bloomberg terminals using excel to gather all 
the relevant variables for all the companies from the five indexes, 2008-2012. 
This will be focusing on five markets the UK (FTSE 100), Germany (HDAX), 
France (CAC 40), US (S & P500) and the Japan (NIKKI 225). These are all 
developed countries; this should prevent the influence of difference in the 
state of the economy on the results. I have collected 4480 observations, from 
the five markets over five years in this study. I will also be focusing on multiple 
factors that will allow for a broader range of factors, the variables are listed in 
the table 4.1.2 and will be comparing to the dependent variables in table 4.1.1 
 
Tian and Twite (2011) described the board characteristics as being one of the 
main measures of corporate governance. So to reflect the levels of corporate 
governance, I will be using board characteristics such as board size, 
percentage of independent directors and the meetings per year. The 
Bloomberg’s ESG disclosure score variable will be used to show the companies 
level of disclosure in connection with ESG, which is expected to have a 
correlation between the CG and firm performance.  
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Performance indicator 
 
The indicators will be downloaded from Bloomberg, they use the following 
formulas:  
Return on Assets 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Return on Equity 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 =
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
 
Return on Capital 
𝑅𝑂𝐶 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
 
Tobin Q 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛 𝑄 =
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝 + 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
 
These performance indicators have been downloaded from Bloomberg pre-
calculated, but these are the formula that they have used to calculate them. 
The reason for downloading the pre-calculated values is because this is more 
accurate, avoiding miscalculation but also makes it a lot easier to get the 
values for all the observations.  
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Table 4.1.1 Definition ESG and Performance Variables (Bloomberg,  2014) 
Performance Indicators Definition and the measurement 
ROA Return on Assets (ROA, in percentage) is an indicator of how 
profitable a company is relative to its total assets. ROA gives an idea 
as to how efficient management is at using its assets to generate 
earnings.  
 
ROC Metric that measures the return that an investment generates for 
capital contributors. It indicates how effective a company is turning 
capital into profits. 
 
TOBIN Q 
 
 
Ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement cost of the 
firm's assets. The Q ratio is useful for the valuation of a company. It 
is based in the hypothesis that in the long run the market value of a 
company should roughly equal the cost of replacing the company's 
assets. 
 
ROE Return on Equity (ROE, in percentage) measures a corporation's 
profitability by revealing how much profit a company generates with 
the money shareholders have invested.   
 
ESG Disclosure Score 
 
 
Proprietary Bloomberg score based on the extent of a company's 
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosure. The score 
ranges from 0.1 for companies that disclose a minimum amount of 
ESG data to 100 for those that disclose every data point collected by 
Bloomberg. 
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Table 4.1.2 Definition Independent Variables (Bloomberg,  2014) 
Equation symbol Definition 
BOARDSIZE The total number of directors on the board. 
PCTINDEPDIRECTOR 
 The percentage of the board members that are 
independent directors. 
BOARDM The number of board meeting per year. 
INDEPATT Percentage of board meetings attended by 
independent directors during the latest period.   
 
LNMKTCAP 
 
The company’s market capital is the total value of the 
issued shares; this can be used as an indicator for 
company size.  Natural Logarithm of market capital 
 
LEVERAGE Indicator for leverage, the total liabilities divided by 
the total shareholder equity 
 
INDUSTRY 
The companies industry sector on Bloomberg, the 
industry sectors numbered 1-10 
 
COUNTRY                               
                                       
Country Numbered 1-5 
 
ADVO 
 
 
 
As defined by the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, this 
includes any person or group that makes investment 
recommendations or conducts securities analysis in 
return for a fee, whether through direct management 
of client assets or via written publications. May also be 
referred to as a "financial advisor". 
 
GOVO Percentage of Government ownership 
INDIVIDUALO Percentage of Individual  ownership 
PEO Percentage of pension fund ownership 
INSO Percentage of insurance  company  ownership 
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The ESG disclosure performance measures are based on Bloomberg’s analysis 
of third-party information, which is converted into Bloomberg’s scoring 
system. Bloomberg (2014) describe the disclosure score as follows: 
“The score ranges from 0.1 for companies that disclose a minimum amount 
of ESG data to 100 for those that disclose every data point collected by 
Bloomberg. Each data point is weighted in terms of importance, with data 
such as Greenhouse Gas Emissions carrying greater weight than other 
disclosures. The score is also tailored to different industry sectors. In this 
way, each company is only evaluated in terms of the data that is relevant to 
its industry sector” (Bloomberg, 2014). 
The dummy variables I used are for the industry and country these are just 
numbered 1-5 for country and 1-10 for industry. These will show that there is 
some relationship between the variable and the determinate but not how they 
are related as they are not fully reflected. The ownerships information is a 
percentage of the total ownership, which can be used to compare the level of 
ownership for each option, government, advisor, pensions, insurance and 
individual.  
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Data Collection Results 
 
 The descriptive statistic of the data collected in table 4.1.3 reveals interesting 
information about some of the variables. The average board size is 9.75 this 
is larger than some of the literature recommends; Jensen (1993) recommends 
seven or eight although it is closer to Lipton and Lorsch (1992) who suggest 
eight or nine. The average for the percentage of independent directors is 51% 
this is lower than the literature suggested. However they do suggest that most 
boards having a majority independent director on the board, the average here 
is just over half. 
 
The average ESG disclosure is very low just 29 out of 100; there is a large 
range in scores form 1-79. This is indicates this is a good sample of companies 
with ESG disclosure ranging from slight to substantial. The ownership is 
interesting with the average government, pension, insurance and individual 
ownership just 2% and advisor 63%. 
Table 4.1.3 Data descriptive statistics 
  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. 
ROA 0.046042 0.034721 0.46753 -0.58137 0.070072 
ROC 0.099023 0.07469 1.347 -0.61922 0.104571 
ROE 0.13989 0.113243 6.376346 -1.785789 0.235391 
TOBINQ 1.692663 1.411 13.6376 0.5989 0.975708 
ESG 28.98157 27.686 78.83 1.336 16.2523 
COUNTRY 2.397321 1 5 1 1.718188 
INDUSTRY 4.91183 4 9 1 2.616356 
LEVERAGE 66.6494 25.24785 7493.973 -322.6372 257.6892 
LNMKTCAP 7.902954 8.486872 12.64178 1.111997 2.413045 
PCTINDEPDIRECTOR 0.5106 0.6364 0.95 0.01 0.343326 
BOARDSIZE 9.748907 11 33 1 4.781243 
BOARDM 8.917067 8 53 1 5.085477 
INDEPATT 0.841836 0.75 1 0.4444 0.104602 
GOVO 0.02152 0.01376 0.96641 0.00129 0.063167 
ADVO 0.633995 0.79517 0.92713 0.0218 0.300278 
PEO 0.027031 0.0242 0.12463 0.001 0.009846 
INSO 0.026488 0.01358 0.79517 0.00121 0.049554 
INDIVIDUALO 0.021223 0.004 0.65552 1.00E-05 0.062604 
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I completed a Pearson correlation analysis on the independent variables this 
will check for the degree of multicollinearity between the variables.  There are 
no coefficients exceeding 0.8 which is a good indicator, so I have concluded 
that multicollinearity is not a problem in this case. If there had been any 
variables that were correlated then I would have to change my models to 
account for multicollinearity. 
 
Table 4.1.4 Pearson Correlation  
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4.2: Regression Fix Effect and Random Effect Model Test 
 
The first thing to consider is which model to use for each of the regressions; 
this can be easily tested using Likelihood ratio fixed effect test and the 
Hausman test. This is completed in Eview by setting either the time or cross-
section to Fixed. Then running the Likelihood ratio test this result shows 
whether to use an OLS model or the fixed or random effect models. If the 
Likelihood test results returns a null hypothesis H0 then we use the OLS, if the 
null hypotheses is rejected t we move on to test for the fixed and random 
effect models.  
When the Likelihood fixed effect model is passed then we run the Hausman 
test start by setting the time or cross-section to Random then run the test this 
will show if the random effect model or the fixed effect model is most 
appropriate. When the null hypothesis is accepted we will use the random 
effect model, when rejected we used the fixed effect model.  
ESG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The likelihood ratio test (Table 4.2.1) has a p-value of 97% so we accept null 
hypothesis H0, these means that the most appropriate model for the ESG 
regression is the OLS. If this null hypothesis is not rejected, the data can simply 
be pooled together and OLS employed. 
 
The regression on the independent variables to the ESG disclosure, will be run 
and then tested, the first test is the likelihood ratio fixed effect test. 
Table4.2.1 ESG likelihood Test   
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: ESGALL   
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 0.120868 (4,1739) 0.9751 
Period Chi-square 0.489521 4 0.9745 
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ROA 
The likelihood ratio test results (Table 4.2.2) has a p-value less than 1% 
indicating that we reject the null hypothesis H0 and accept H1 panel data 
approach. This will then be tested using the Hausman test 
 
 
 
 
 
The Hausman test result (Table 4.2.3) had a p- value less than 1% indicating 
that the random effect model is not appropriate and the fixed effect 
specification is preferred.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROC 
The likelihood ratio test results (Table 4.2.4) has a p-value greater than 10% 
indicating that we accept the null hypothesis H0 and reject H1 panel data 
approach. This mean that the OLS approach will be used. 
Table4.2.4 ROC likelihood Test   
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: FIRMEQ2ROC   
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 1.177187 (4,1756) 0.3189 
Period Chi-square 4.753328 4 0.3136 
     
     
 
 
 
Table4.2.2 ROA likelihood Test   
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: FIRMEQ1ROA   
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 4.674187 (4,1949) 0.0009 
Period Chi-square 18.789036 4 0.0009 
Table4.2.3 ROA HausmanTest  
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: FIRMEQ1ROA   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 32.476913 7 0.0000 
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ROE 
The likelihood ratio test results (Table 4.2.5) has a p-value greater than 10% 
indicating that we accept the null hypothesis H0 and reject H1 panel data 
approach. This mean that the OLS approach will be used. 
Table 4.2.5 ROE likelihood Test   
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: FIRMEQ3ROE   
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 0.563782 (4,1933) 0.6890 
Period Chi-square 2.275966 4 0.6851 
 
TOBINQ 
The likelihood ratio test results (Table 4.2.6) has a p-value greater than 10% 
indicating that we accept the null hypothesis H0 and reject H1 panel data 
approach. This mean that the OLS approach will be used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results are summarised in Table 4.2.7, these are the most appropriate models 
and the ones I will use in my research for the regression analysis.  
 
Table 4.2.7 Estimation Model test results  
Results for the Fixed and Random Test 
ESG ROA ROE ROC TOBINQ 
OLS FIXED OLS OLS OLS 
  
Table 4.2.6 TOBINQ likelihood Test   
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: FIRMEQ4TOBINQ   
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 1.230539 (4,1952) 0.2958 
Period Chi-square 4.963810 4 0.2910 
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4.3: Summary of Analysis Results 
 
After successfully collecting all the data and testing for the most appropriate  
regression model the collected results from the regressions have been put 
together in a table for analysis. The significant results are shown in tables 
4.3.1 and 4.3.2 below.   
The regression for the ESG has revealed that there are statistically significant 
coefficient between most of the independent variables and ESG disclosure the 
dependent variable. The result reveals a lot about the factors that influence 
the ESG score.  
Table 4.3.1 ESG Results 
 ESG Disclosure OLS 
  ROA ROC ROE TobinQ 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Performance indicator 
(ROA/ROE/ROC/TobinQ) 15.88806*** 10.83719*** 4.336329*** -0.728098*** 
COUNTRY 1.788601*** 1.759646*** 1.817281*** 1.595821*** 
INDUSTRY -0.510503*** -0.566922*** -0.512911*** -0.518663*** 
BOARDSIZE 0.689106*** 0.643554*** 0.666483*** 0.642245*** 
INDEPATT 21.48393*** 22.23464*** 21.39529*** 24.84868*** 
GOVO 57.63101*** 53.18346*** 56.26375*** 55.48978*** 
PEO 112.8713*** 88.72515** 110.5609*** 106.8317*** 
INSO 46.23175*** 44.18439** 48.01259*** 48.10325*** 
INDIVIDUALO -43.25268*** -42.87086*** -41.06881*** -40.21641*** 
                                * p<0.1                           ** p<0.05                    *** p<0.01 
 
 The ESG disclosure was positively correlated to ROA, ROE, ROC, Board 
size, independent attendance, government ownership, and Pension 
companies and insurance company ownership. 
 The ESG disclosure score was negatively correlated to TOBINQ, 
INDUSTRY and individual owner.  
 The ESG disclosure is also connected to industry and country. 
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The main variables that are identified as being significant are performance 
indicators, country, industry, board size, independent director meeting 
attendance, government, pension, insurance and individual ownership. These 
results are further analysed in section 4.4. 
The performance indicator regression results show there are a large amount 
of statistical significant coefficients, indicating that there is a strong 
correlation between the independent variables and the dependent 
performance indicators. 
 ESG is positively correlated to ROA, ROC, ROE and negative to TobinQ. 
 There is a positive correlation for board independency and individual 
ownership. 
 There is a negative correlation for board size and number of meetings. 
The main variable’s that are significant to all the firm performance are ESG, 
Country, leverage, Independent directors, board size, meeting attendance and 
individual ownership. These are all consistent except for ESG and Leverage. 
ESG is positive for all the indictors except for the TOBINQ. Leverage is all 
negative except the ROE. These results are further analysed in section 4.5.  
Table 4.3.2 Performance Indicator Results 
 ROA ROE ROC TOBINQ 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
ESG 0.000259*** 0.001331*** 0.000383*** -0.003155** 
COUNTRY -0.004401*** -0.026211*** -0.016327*** -0.146483*** 
LEVERAGE -0.001290*** 0.000241*** -0.0000328** -0.000311*** 
LNMKTCAP 0.001393** 0.001785 0.001349 0.028133*** 
PCTINDEPDIRECTOR 0.020152*** 0.044741** 0.017866** 0.600936*** 
M BOARDSIZE -0.001557*** -0.003183* -0.002056*** -0.029537*** 
BOARDM -0.002520*** -0.007196*** -0.002991*** -0.026855*** 
INDEPATT  0.269558*** 0.194674*** 2.591676*** 
ADVO 0.002695 -0.033545 -0.014023* 0.160952** 
PEO -0.070602 0.799199 -0.155 -5.670043** 
INDIVIDUALO 0.120179*** 0.070902 0.148056*** 1.149195** 
 Fixed OLS OLS OLS 
 * p<0.1                           ** p<0.05                    *** p<0.01 
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4.4: Results ESG 
 
This analysis for the connection between the independent variables and ESG 
was to determine if there is any connection between ESG disclosure and the 
other independent variable. This will help when reviewing the result of the 
performance indicators also revealing more about the ESG disclosure, testing 
hypothesis H4 H5 H6.  
 
Table 4.4.1 ESG Results 
ESG ROA ROC ROE TobinQ 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Performance indicator 
(ROA/ROE/ROC/TobinQ) 15.88806*** 10.83719*** 4.336329*** -0.728098*** 
COUNTRY 1.788601*** 1.759646*** 1.817281*** 1.595821*** 
INDUSTRY -0.510503*** -0.566922*** -0.512911*** -0.518663*** 
LEVERAGE     
LNMKTCAP     
PCTINDEPDIRECTOR     
BOARDSIZE 0.689106*** 0.643554*** 0.666483*** 0.642245*** 
BOARDM     
INDEPATT 21.48393*** 22.23464*** 21.39529*** 24.84868*** 
GOVO 57.63101*** 53.18346*** 56.26375*** 55.48978*** 
ADVO     
PEO 112.8713*** 88.72515** 110.5609*** 106.8317*** 
INSO 46.23175*** 44.18439** 48.01259*** 48.10325*** 
INDIVIDUALO -43.25268*** -42.87086*** -41.06881*** -40.21641*** 
 OLS                               * p<0.1                           ** p<0.05                    *** p<0.01 
 
The results show that ESG disclosure score is strongly connected to the 
ownership structure, as it can reflect the firm’s policies, regulations or ethics. 
The ownership by government, pension funds and insurance companies will 
have different objectives than individual investors, such as sustainability, 
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diversification, regulation and ethical investments. This is reflected in the 
correlation of ownership and the ESG score, as the individual owners has a 
negative affect this could be a focus on profit rather than diversification. The 
TOBINQ had a negative correlation this could also reflect the need for profit 
over the levels of disclosure.  
There is a strong connection between the ownership and the ESG disclosure, 
this supports the H4 Hypothesis. Government ownership has a highly positive 
coefficient at a statistically significant level +53.14***, while individual 
ownership has a highly negative coefficient at a statistically significant level. 
The government, pension and insurance companies will require more 
disclosure from companies that it invests in, whereas individuals might not 
require this level of disclosure and concentrate more about the returns. The 
results are interesting because the individual ownership was -42.79*** as this 
indicates that individual ownership has a negative connection on the levels of 
ESG disclosure. This is probably reflected in the governments having  stricter 
regulation and the individual focused more on profit rather that disclosure so 
individual investors are probably not as responsible investors.  
There is a significantly positive correlation between the board size and the ESG 
disclosure, this supports the H6 Hypothesis.  The result of +0.689*** for the 
regression with ROA, this is not as high as some of the other variables such 
as independent meeting attendance +21.483*** but it is significant.  The 
literature discussed the important characteristic including board size, but 
there is no research comparing board size to the Bloomberg ESG disclosure 
score. The findings of this research show that the corporate governance 
factors that are correlated to ESG disclosure are board size and independent 
director meeting attendance.   
The board size and independent director meeting attendance are positively 
correlated to the ESG this implies that bigger boards with better independent 
director attendance lead to more ESG disclosure. This could be because of the 
corporate governance and the structure of the board, reflect the disclosure 
system structure. However there is not a statistically significant correlation 
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between the percentage or independent directors and the ESG disclosure; this 
means that H5 Hypothesis is not supported. 
The literature characterises independent directors as a key part of corporate 
governance, with research connecting them to the higher levels of voluntary 
disclosure. García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2010) findings showed that 
more independent boards are associated with higher voluntary disclosure. 
However this papers results show that there is no significant connection 
between independent directors and ESG disclosure; this is similar to Ho and 
Tower (2011) who found no significant connection to voluntary disclosure.  
The ROA, ROE and ROC are significantly positively correlated to the ESG 
disclosure; this could reflect that companies with higher returns have better 
ESG disclosure. However the TobinQ is negatively correlated indicating the 
market value to book value has a negative effect on the ESG disclosure. This 
highlights the difference in the firms performance based on returns or market 
value. ROA is a measure of the overall effectiveness of management in 
generating returns, whereas TobinQ is a measure of the financial markets 
value of performance. 
 Industry and country are connected to ESG but we cannot say how because 
the variables are dummy variables, so all we can say is that there is a 
connection between them. This reflects the information gathered from 
Bloomberg that states that the levels of ESG and ESG disclosure are different 
for the industry, and is also calculated differently.  
These finding show that there is a strong connection between the ESG 
disclosure score and the performance of the firm, this should lead to more 
sophisticated models being developed to include more non-financial 
information. Eccles et al.(2011) have predicted that the markets interest in 
non-financial information will increase exponentially, leading to companies 
disclosing more information that will lead to more complex model being 
developed by investors to analyse companies.  
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ESG Key Points 
 The ESG disclosure is positively correlated to government, insurance 
and pension company ownership, whereas it is negatively correlated to 
individual ownership. This reflects the importance for ownership on ESG 
disclosure, this is probably connected to regulations and policies.  
 
 The ESG disclosure is positively correlated to ROA, ROE and ROC, 
However it is negative to TobinQ. This reflects how ESG disclosure is 
positively connected to company’s returns, but negatively to the market 
value. 
 
 The ESG disclosure score is connected to the industry and the country. 
This was mentioned in chapter 2 and 3, as these are important part of 
the ESG disclosure. Bloomberg also account for the industry when they 
are calculating the disclosure score.  
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4.5: Results Firm Performance 
 
The reason that the firm’s performance was tested on ROA, ROE, ROC and 
TOBINQ was to cover possible different aspects of the company performance. 
ROA, ROE and ROC reflect the return compared to capital, assets and equity 
which can have different results dependent of the firm’s management.   
 
The ESG disclosure is significantly positively correlated to ROA, ROE and ROC; 
however it is significantly negatively correlated with TOBINQ. This indicates 
that the ESG disclosure is a positive indicator for return which could be linked 
to the corporate governance and disclosure practices. This might be negative 
to TOBINQ because some market investor’s priority includes ethical 
investment, so the level of disclosure could influence market investors 
decisions. This reflects the ESG test from section 4.4, the positive effect on 
the internal returns of the company but a negative relationship with the market 
value to book value. 
Table 4.5.1 Performance Indicator Results 
 ROA ROE ROC TOBINQ 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
ESG 0.000259*** 0.001331*** 0.000383*** -0.003155** 
COUNTRY -0.004401*** -0.026211*** -0.016327*** -0.146483*** 
INDUSTRY     
LEVERAGE -0.001290*** 0.000241*** -0.0000328** -0.000311*** 
LNMKTCAP 0.001393**   0.028133*** 
PCTINDEPDIRECTOR 0.020152*** 0.044741** 0.017866** 0.600936*** 
M BOARDSIZE -0.001557*** -0.003183* -0.002056*** -0.029537*** 
BOARDM -0.002520*** -0.007196*** -0.002991*** -0.026855*** 
INDEPATT  0.269558*** 0.194674*** 2.591676*** 
GOVO     
ADVO   -0.014023* 0.160952** 
PEO    -5.670043** 
INSO     
INDIVIDUALO 0.120179***  0.148056*** 1.149195** 
 Fixed OLS OLS OLS 
 * p<0.1                           ** p<0.05                    *** p<0.01 
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The ownership does not have a large connection to the performance indication 
except the individual investor that is positively correlated to ROA, ROC and 
TobinQ. This could indicate the difference in the objective of the owners, 
individual owners want to maximise profit, however government, pensions 
and insurance companies want to have sustainably, diversify and improve 
employment (government).  
The regression had an interesting result that the ownership, mainly the 
individual investors were correlated to the performance indicators. This 
further shows the difference in the priorities of the investors, the difference 
between the need for return on investment and the other reasons for 
investing. This finding in connection with the findings from section 4.4 that 
individual ownership was negative to ESG disclosure, but is positive to firm 
performance.  
Board size was significantly negatively correlated for all performance 
indicators, indicating that larger boards must have a negative effect on the 
firm’s performance. This is reflects the finding from the literature review in 
section 2.1. The empirical evidence appears to support this view, with a 
multiple studies documenting a significantly negative relation between board 
size and corporate performance. This was an interesting result, as Fooladi 
(2011) and Bermig and Frick (2010) found no statistical significant connection, 
whereas Cater (et al., 2003) and Guest (2009) found negative connection. 
However Eisenberg et al. (1998) found evidence of a negative correlation 
between board size and firm profitability. 
This research can further support the negative correlation between board size 
and firm performance, although board size is positively correlated to ESG 
disclosure. The board size influence on the company seems complex 
improving voluntary disclosure but reducing financial performance, this could 
represent the additional costs involved in both good corporate governance 
and higher ESG disclosure. Some of the research has reviewed the associated 
costs with voluntary disclosure, and raised the question does the cost out way 
the benefits (García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010).  
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Board meeting per year was significantly negative for all, like the board size 
and the number of meetings must have a negative effect on performance. This 
could be an area that is to the performance of the board, maybe the more 
meets means that there are more problems. Interestingly the independent 
director meeting attendance was positively correlated. So this could indicate 
that independent directors have a more positive influence.   
The percentage of independent directors was significantly positively 
correlated to ROA, ROE, ROC and TOBINQ. This means that Independent 
directors have a positive influence on the firm’s performance in all four 
aspects. This reflects the finding in the literature review from section 2.1. Sami 
et al. (2011), Bonn (2004), Cho and Rui (2007) found a positive correlation 
between the independent directors and firm performance, however Bhagat and 
Black, (2001) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008) found a negative correlation. 
So this research supports the positive connection of independent directors 
and firm performance. The independent director attendance like the number 
of independent directors also has a positive connection of the firm’s 
performance, this could further emphasise the importance of board 
independence. 
The leverage variable is negatively correlated to ROA, ROC and TOBINQ, but 
Positive for ROE. This will have a connection to the way that the companies 
used the leverage; ROE is related to equity so more leverage will positively 
increase the return from the equity. However leverage can have a negative 
effect on the firm’s performance so will have a negative effect on the other 
indicators 
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Performance Indicator Key Points 
 The ESG disclosure is positively correlated to ROA, ROE, and ROC but 
negative for TOBINQ. This reflects the ESG test, there is a positive effect 
on the returns of the company but a negative relationship with the 
market value to book value (TobinQ). 
 The country variable is significantly correlated to firm performance. 
 Leverage is negatively correlated to ROA, ROC and TOBINQ Positive ROE. 
 The percentage of independent directors was positively correlated to 
ROA, ROE, ROC and TOBINQ. This means that Independent director have 
a positive influence on the firm’s performance in all four aspects. 
 Independent directors meeting attendance positive for all, this is the 
same as the number of independent directors must have a positive 
effect on the firm’s performance.  
 Board size was negatively correlated for all; larger boards appear to have 
a negative effect on the firm’s performance. Some of the empirical 
evidence supports this view. This could be the board size effect, that 
implies that larger groups are harder to coordinate and reduced have 
reduced communication.   
 Board meeting attendance was negative for all; the greater number of 
meets must have a negative effect on performance maybe indicating 
problems that they are trying to solve. 
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4.6 Conclusion of Analysis Results  
 
The results from the 4480 observations collected from the five markets have 
revealed that there is a link between the performance, ownership, board size, 
industry, country and ESG disclosure. From the above analysis the conclusion 
is that there is a strong association between the ESG disclosure, corporate 
governance and firm performance. However the variables can affect 
performance in different ways, showing that the way the company’s 
performance is measured is important.  
 
There is a strong connection between the ESG disclosure, corporate 
governance, ownership and firm performance. The key results for the 
performance indicators are highlighted in table 4.6.1.   There is a positive 
correlation for ESG, independent directors, independent directors meeting 
attendance and individual ownership. Whereas a negative correlation to 
leverage, board size and board meetings. The results provide a supporting 
view for some of the literature but also some conflicts.  
 
 
 
Table 4.6.1 Highlights Results 
 ROA ROE ROC TOBINQ 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
ESG 0.000259*** 0.001331*** 0.000383*** -0.003155** 
COUNTRY -0.004401*** -0.026211*** -0.016327*** -0.146483*** 
LEVERAGE -0.001290*** 0.000241*** -0.0000328** -0.000311*** 
PCTINDEPDIRECTOR 0.020152*** 0.044741** 0.017866** 0.600936*** 
M BOARDSIZE -0.001557*** -0.003183* -0.002056*** -0.029537*** 
BOARDM -0.002520*** -0.007196*** -0.002991*** -0.026855*** 
INDEPATT 0.083735 0.269558*** 0.194674*** 2.591676*** 
INDIVIDUALO 0.120179*** 0.070902 0.148056*** 1.149195** 
 Fixed OLS OLS OLS 
 
* p<0.1                           
** p<0.05                    
*** p<0.01 
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Table 4.6.2 ESG Results 
ESG ROA ROC ROE TobinQ 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Performance indicator 
(ROA/ROE/ROC/TobinQ) 15.88806*** 10.83719*** 4.336329*** -0.728098*** 
COUNTRY 1.788601*** 1.759646*** 1.817281*** 1.595821*** 
INDUSTRY -0.510503*** -0.566922*** -0.512911*** -0.518663*** 
BOARDSIZE 0.689106*** 0.643554*** 0.666483*** 0.642245*** 
INDEPATT 21.48393*** 22.23464*** 21.39529*** 24.84868*** 
GOVO 57.63101*** 53.18346*** 56.26375*** 55.48978*** 
PEO 112.8713*** 88.72515** 110.5609*** 106.8317*** 
INSO 46.23175*** 44.18439** 48.01259*** 48.10325*** 
INDIVIDUALO -43.25268*** -42.87086*** -41.06881*** -40.21641*** 
 OLS                               * p<0.1                           ** p<0.05                    *** p<0.01 
 
The regression on the ESG disclosure revealed lots of interesting results; there 
is a strong connection between the performance indicator, country, industry, 
board size, independent meeting attendance and ownership to ESG disclosure 
(table 4.6.2). There is a positive correlation between board size, independent 
meeting attendance and the levels of ESG disclosure. This demonstrates the 
effect of corporate governance and the companies ESG disclosure levels.  
These all have a strong influence on the level of ESG disclosure interestingly 
the ownership highly negative for the individual owners and highly positive for 
Government, Pensions and Insurance. This could illustrate rules and 
regulations that government, pensions and insurance companies follow that 
positively influence disclosure levels. So individual investors might not require 
as much disclosure, the literature has discussed how when companies 
ownership becomes more diverse, the level of information disclosure can 
increase. The negative result for individual investor might indicate their 
investment approach, they are concerned most about maximising profit, so 
might be investing in ‘sin stock’ or higher performance without concern for 
the ESG information. 
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H1: There is a positive relationship between ESG disclosure score and the 
firm performance. 
The results show that the ESG disclosure is positively connected to all the 
return ratios indicating good performance but negative the market based 
TobinQ. This supports the H1 hypothesis except for the TobinQ, so the 
hypothesis is dependent upon the definition of firm performance. This is why 
I did robust testing, comparing multiple performance indicators, H1 passed 
for three out of four. This could illustrate that the ESG disclosure affects 
different aspects of performance, in this case the difference between the 
internal and market performance ratios. 
 
H2: There is a negative relationship between the board size and board 
meetings to the firm performance. 
Board size and meetings attended are negatively correlated to all indicators, 
which supports the H2 hypothesis. The literature explains how with larger 
boards it becomes harder for the CEO to control and the larger groups find it 
harder to come to a collective decision.  
 
H3: There is a positive relationship between the percentage of 
independent directors and the firm performance. 
Independent director are positively correlated to all the performance 
indicators, suggesting that they have a positive effect on the company. This 
supports the H3 hypothesis, reflecting the previous research and the current 
trend of majority independent boards. The independency of the board will 
improve the board’s objectivity and better allow them to fulfil their goal of 
connecting the investors’ interest with the management. 
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H4: There is a relationship between the ownership and the ESG disclosure 
scores.  
The results show that the government ownership has a highly positive 
connection to ESG discloser whereas individual is very negatively correlated.  
This supports the H4 hypothesis, that there is a relationship between the 
ownership and the ESG disclosure. 
 
H5: There is a relationship between the percentage of Independent 
directors and the ESG disclosure scores.  
There is not a statistically significant correlation between the percentage or 
independent directors and the ESG disclosure; this means that H5 Hypothesis 
is not supported. This means that we accept the null hypothesis.  
 
H6: There is a relationship between the percentage of board size and the 
ESG disclosure scores.  
There is a significantly positive correlation between the board size and the ESG 
disclosure, this supports the H6 Hypothesis. This is interesting in comparison 
to the performance indicators that are negatively correlated. This indicates 
that there is a positive connection between board size and the levels of ESG 
disclosure, and negative to the firm’s performance.  This raises the question 
does the benefits of better governance and disclosure out way the costs. 
Table 4.6.3 Hypothesis Result Summary 
H1 Supported H4 Supported 
H2 Supported H5 Unsupported 
H3 Supported H6 Supported 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
5.1: Introduction 
 
To conclude this paper has reviewed ESG disclosure and corporate governance 
factors and how they are connected to the firm’s performance. There is a lot 
of research in corporate governance and firm performance looking at similar 
factors; however there are not many that look at the Bloomberg ESG disclosure 
score. This analysis has revealed a lots of interesting results, including 
statically significant correlations between corporate governance factors, ESG 
disclosure score and company performance.  
The paper used regression analysis on panel data, revealing correlation for 
several different factors that have been focused on, board size, independent 
directors and ESG disclosure. This has also highlighted different results 
compared to the finding from the previous literature so this will be 
contributing to the current literature. There are also differences in the results 
for the different performance indicators, demonstrating the need for robust 
testing.  
This dissertation started by critically reviewing the literature on corporate 
governance, independent directors, board size, ownership ESG and voluntary 
disclosure. This allowed for the deployment of the research theoretical frame 
work including the six hypotheses that are tested. The data was collected from 
the five markets over five years giving 4480 observations, using Eview to run 
multi-liner regressions to test for the correlation between the dependent and 
independent variables. Then analysing the result to test the hypothesis and 
relate the critical literature review to better understand the findings.  
The results show that the ESG disclosure is positively connected to all of the 
return ratios indicating better internal financial performance but negative to 
the market based performance TobinQ. This still supports the H1 hypothesis 
for three out of four performance indicators. The relationship with return 
shows that ESG disclosure has a positive connection on the firm’s ability to 
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affectively gain a high return using the assets, capital and equity. The negative 
relationship to the TobinQ means that it is negatively connected to the market 
value. This could mean that the ESG disclosure is a good indicator for return 
performance, but not for the market performance of a firm. 
Company board size and number of meetings per year are negatively 
correlated to all performance indicators, which supports the H2 hypothesis. 
The literature explains that when the board size increases it becomes harder 
for the CEO to control the meetings, also larger groups find it harder to come 
to a collective decision. This is similar for the number of meeting, indicating 
that they are coming to effective collective decisions. There is some literature 
that argues board size effect is only for small firms, as for larger more complex 
companies they will need a larger board to effective manage the management. 
This is one of the reasons that large companies are divided into division or 
sub companies. 
Independent directors are positively correlated to all of the performance 
indicators, suggesting that they have a positive effect on the company. This 
supports the H3 hypothesis, reflecting the previous research and the current 
trend of majority independent boards. However there is not a statistically 
significant correlation between the percentage of independent directors and 
the ESG disclosure; this means that H5 Hypothesis is not supported. This 
means that we accept the null hypothesis.  
Independent directors have been highly debated in previous research, with 
many arguments for the positive effect on the corporate governance and 
company performance. This analysis has found that there is a statically 
significant positive correlation between percentages of independent director 
on the board, and firm performance.  This supports the previous literature 
that argues that more board independence improves performance, by 
effectively developing company’s management structure. 
The ownership shows that the government ownership has a high positive 
connection of ESG discloser, whereas individual ownership are very negatively 
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correlated.  This supports the H4 hypothesis, that there is a relationship 
between the ownership and the ESG disclosure. There is a significantly positive 
correlation between the board size and the ESG disclosure, this supports the 
H6 Hypothesis. This is interesting in comparison to the performance indicators 
results that had board size as negatively correlated. This indicates that there 
is a positive connection between board size and the levels of ESG disclosure, 
and negative to the firm’s performance. This could have a connection between 
the associated cost involved in the corporate governance and voluntary 
disclosure. 
The results from the analysis has supported five of the hypothesis and rejected 
one. This has added to the previous research supporting some findings from 
the previous research but also revealing results for the new areas of research 
ESG disclosure scores. The independent director and board size results 
support some of the previous research. There is a strong indication that 
ownership is very important to ESG disclosure, with the larger negative 
correlation for individual put highly positive for government, pension and 
insurance companies. The results for the Bloomberg ESG disclosure score 
provide new information for this under researched area, showing a connection 
to performance indicators, board size, ownership and independent meeting 
attendance. 
The continually evolving financial markets, in the wake of the recent financial 
crisis have changed the way the modern portfolios are managed. Modern 
portfolio management has the approach of gaining the highest possible return 
at the lowest level of risk, creating more complex company evaluation that 
needs to include more than just traditional indicators. Corporate governance 
and ESG performance has become an important factor for investors, creating 
the need for companies to disclose more information. This research has found 
a positive connection between the ESG disclosure and firm performance, 
indicating that it is a positive indicator for firm performance except for the 
market value.  
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5.2: Recommendation and Further Research 
 
Recommendations 
 
Based on the findings from this research and analysis, the recommendation 
for the research question does ESG disclosure and corporate governance have 
a connection to firm performance? This research revealed interesting 
information that could help companies and investors.  
The levels of voluntary ESG disclosure by companies is growing, this is a sign 
of the increasing importance of the information. The corporations and 
investors need to start including this information within their business 
objectives. Companies will gain advantages such as lower costs of capital and 
better operational reputation, also as this paper shows there is a positive 
connection between the ESG and the firm’s performance. The importance of 
ESG disclosure is shown in the results of this report, however there is a large 
cost associated with the levels of disclosure but the literature has mentioned 
that the regulation on ESG disclosure are increasing, so companies need to get 
ahead of this as it will make it easier to disclose information later on.  
The size of the board is an important factor to consider, this is not to say that 
every company should have a small board, but there is evidence that shows 
that larger boards have a negative influence on performance. The optimum 
board size is a complex decision, as small boards may be more efficient but 
more complex companies will need bigger boards. Companies will need to 
consider this factor as well as the negative connection between the number of 
meeting and performance. This implies that the structure of the board is an 
important contributor to performance. There is a positive connection between 
independent directors and performance, this supports the current trend of 
having majority independent boards. Although there is no fixed board 
structure this research indicates to avoid large boards and excessive number 
of meetings per year and to have a high percentage of independent directors.  
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The investors can use this ESG disclosure measure as a positive indicator on 
firm performance return but have to consider the effect on the market value. 
They can also consider the corporate governance factors, as from this research 
there is a strong connection between them and firm performance. They could 
develop investment strategies that take into account the changes in the boards 
that would predict possible changes in the firm’s future stability and 
performance.  
The main recommendation is that everyone including the corporations, 
investors and stake holders need to consider the corporate governance and 
ESG disclosure. This research has revealed multiple connection between the 
different factors and performance, this could be used to establish an analysis 
of the companies stability and potential future performance. This could be 
further researched to help support or expand the results.  
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Further Research 
The relationship between the board size and performance could be further 
investigated, with a strong separation between small companies and large 
complex companies. Do larger companies need larger boards or do larger 
boards restrict the levels of governance within the organisation? The 
separation between the small companies and large companies would further 
the understanding of this relationship.  
Independent directors in this research were found to have a positive 
connection with performance. However the connection between the 
independent directors and the other factors could be further researched, to 
identify why they have a positive correlation.  
The connection between ESG disclosure and the firms other factors including 
profit, stock price, dividends and share returns could be researched. This 
would expand the connection found in this research, maybe expanding upon 
the negative connection to TobinQ. 
How well does the ESG disclosure sore reflect the actual ESG performance? 
This could be that companies that have good ESG have better disclosure. 
However companies that would typically have bad ESG would be highly 
regulated so this might explain the high disclosure.  
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